This paper investigates optimal tax policy with uncertainty in private and public consumption. Tax policy affects volatility through two channels; spreading risk between public and private consumption and hedging idiosyncratic tax source risk. This paper develops an excessive risk index to quantify the amount of unnecessary risk governments accept. For US state governments, I find the cost of inefficient risk is roughly 40% of their expected tax revenues. This cost is mostly due to states being overdependent on a given tax source, e.g., income or sales taxes. In 2014, 36 states are found to be overdependent in either the income or sales tax.
Introduction
The principles of optimal taxation have been built up from a large literature that has considered efficiency, redistribution, agency costs, among others. However, there are still open questions about how optimal tax principles differ when uncertainty is added. In part this is due to the fact that uncertainty can arise from, and impact, many different facets of an optimal tax model. Most of the literature on optimal taxation and uncertainty has focused on uncertainty of private consumption through uncertainty about production or wages (see, e.g., Eaton and Rosen, 1980; Diamond and Mirrlees, 1978) . The purpose of this paper is to analyze optimal taxation when there is uncertainty over private and public consumption. The optimal tax policy when uncertainty is added to private and public consumption in a standard model characterizes the tradeoff between tax revenue volatility and deadweight loss. This tradeoff produces several novel implications. First, lump sum taxes are no longer optimal because they concentrate risk in private consumption. Second, optimal tax policy reduces to optimal portfolio weights without deadweight loss. This motivates using an op-1 The author is unaware of any other study that has incorporated public consumption uncertainty into a model of optimal taxation.
2 There are several potential reasons states have difficulty smoothing expenditures. First, 49 states have balanced budget constraints, which limit their ability to smooth. Second, there are political economy and moral hazard problems. Third, even when states try to smooth revenues through the use of rainy day funds, these funds have been found to be inadequate Sobel and Holcombe (1996a) .
timal portfolio approach to better understand tax revenue risk. In particular, different tax portfolios are shown to expose governments to different amounts of risk. Some of these portfolios, however, are found to be mean-volatility efficient. That is, there are a set of portfolios such that a government cannot increase its expected revenues without accepting more risk.
This set is a government's minimum volatility frontier.
I develop an excessive risk index to distinguish between efficient and inefficient risk.
This index is comparable across governments and across time and can be interpreted as the percent decrease in expected tax revenue associated with holding a tax portfolio that has excessive risk.
I use data from 1970-2014 on all US states to demonstrate how to calculate the excessive risk index. I find that tax portfolios were on average 7 percent riskier in the 2000s than in the 1970s.
3 Despite the substantial increase in tax risk, excessive risk experienced only a slight increase. Even so, states are accepting a large amount of excessive risk. On average, states could increase their expected tax revenues by roughly 40 percent without having to increase their tax revenue volatility.
The optimal portfolio approach to understand optimal tax policy in the face of uncertainty in tax revenues adds to a literature that considers the costs of suboptimal policy in the face of uncertainty (Golosov and Tsyvinski, 2007) . These dynamic Mirrleesian models focus on the misallocation of capital and labor due to uncertainty in privately observable heterogeneous skills (Golosov et al., 2003; Werning, 2007) . 4 I use a representative-agent Ramsey model,
Adding Volatility to a Traditional Optimal Tax Model
The model consists of a representative agent, a government, and nature. First, the government chooses its tax policy. Second, nature chooses the state of the world, captured by income m. Finally, the representative agent chooses his consumption after observing tax policy and income.
The representative agent chooses his consumption of J goods, x = (x 1 , ..., x J ), subject to the budget constraint px ≤ m where m is exogenous income. There is no uncertainty for the representative agent because at the time he chooses x, he observes income m and the government's tax policy choice. 9 The representative agent is risk averse and maximizes his utility, u(x; g), which is increasing and concave in private consumption, x, and the composite public good g. For expositional ease, I make the common assumption that the cross-price elasticities are zero.
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Uncertainty in the model is due to supply-side shocks to income m that enter utility only through uncertainty in consumption. The government does not know the realization of income m when it makes its decision, but it knows the distribution of income, F (m, σ 2 m ).
11
The government anticipates that the representative agent will optimally choose consumption in response to the realization of income and the government's tax policy. The government makes its decision based on the mean and variance-covariance matrix of the representative agent's equilibrium consumption bundle, conditional on the government's tax policy defined as the 1 × J vector of means, µ * x = (µ * 1 , ..., µ * J ), and the J × J variance-covariance matrix,
The government moves first and sets linear taxes on the J consumption goods, τ = (τ 1 , τ 2 , ..., τ J ). By choice of units, I can set the vector of consumer prices to be p = (1 + 9 This model abstracts from uncertainty to individuals, which has been the focus of most of the rest of the extant literature, to focus on tax revenue volatility.
10 Formally, this assumption is that ∂x j /∂p k = 0 for all j = k. This common assumption is made to write the optimal tax rule in a way that is consistent with past derivations of optimal tax rules.
11 For expositional ease, I focus on a distribution of income fully characterized by its mean and variance. The analysis can be extended to allow for higher-order moments. τ 1 , ..., 1 + τ J ). The composite public good, g, is equal to the tax revenues the government collects, with expected value g = τ µ x and variance σ 2 g = τ W x τ.
The expected utility of the representative agent can be written as a function of prices, expected income, expected public good consumption, the variance of income, and the variance of the public good,
where v(p, m, g) is the representative agent's indirect utility function.
The government maximizes the expected utility of the representative agent by setting linear taxes τ ,
where prices, p, and the mean and variance of the public good, g and σ 2 g , are functions of the tax rates the government sets.
The government's problem can be rewritten from choosing tax rates τ on all goods x, to choosing a lump sum tax T, a risk sharing tax rate t, and a good specific taxτ , where Jτ j = 0. This transforms representative agent's budget constraint from
For expositional ease, I write the expected utility function as a function of after-tax incomẽ
). Public and private consumption risk can now be written as a function of the risk sharing tax rate t and the good specific taxτ j ,
From this equation it is clear that t determines the share of risk between public and private 6 consumption andτ affects the hedging of tax revenues.
The government is sensitive to the variances of private and public consumption because the government maximizes the expected utility of a risk-averse representative agent. The government's attitude toward risk encompasses the representative agent's risk preferences and, implicitly, the ability of the representative agent and government to smooth shocks: The government balances costs due to deadweight loss and volatility, which can be summarized by two elasticities. The disutility from deadweight loss is captured by the elasticity of good x k with respect to the tax rate τ k :
The disultility from volatility is captured by the elasticity of the variance of tax revenue with respect to the tax rate τ k , scaled by tax revenue generated by tax rate τ k ,:
The optimally set tax rates balance these costs subject to their importance to utility, captured by the welfare weight, ω = (∂V /∂σ 2 g )(1/(∂V /∂g))σ 2 g . The welfare weight depends on the specific utility function and is the same across all tax rates.
Optimal Tax Rule With Volatility
Theorem 1 Optimal tax policy with volatility is characterized by the rule for any j, k pair,
where ω is a weight that depends on the utility function, ε x k ,τ k is the elasticity of good k with respect to the tax rate τ k , and e σg,τ j is the elasticity of tax revenue volatility with respect to the tax rate τ k , scaled by tax revenues from good k.
The proof of Theorem 1 is provided in Appendix A.
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The optimal tax rule with volatility reflects the tradeoff between deadweight loss and volatility. Each revenue source the government uses balances the costs from distorting consumption behavior, captured by the elasticity, ε x k ,τ k , and the cost of volatility, captured by e σg,τ k . The optimal tax rule implies that governments are willing to accept more distortions to a given good if it decreases the cost of volatility. The following corollaries explore this tradeoff and its implications for optimal tax policy. The proofs for all of the corollaries are given in Appendix A.
3 Implications of the Optimal Tax Rule With Volatility
Comparing Optimal Tax Rules With and Without Volatility
First, consider the optimal tax rule without volatility, when the government knows the state of the world before making its decision.
Corollary 1 When the government knows the state of the world before making its decisions, the optimal tax rule with volatility reduces to the traditional optimal tax rule, which can be written as the inverse elasticity rule,
Corollary 1 restates the traditional optimal tax rule that all goods should have an approximately proportional reduction in compensated demand. 12 This conclusion, however, holds only in the absence of volatility as this conclusion does not follow from the optimal tax rule in equation (1).
12 The inverse elasticity rule can be rewritten to look similar to the optimal tax rule derived in Theorem 1. Combining the inverse elasticity rule for any pair j, k gives the relationship (
This relationship is the optimal tax rule derived in Theorem 1 when the cost of volatility is zero: ε σ,j = 0 for all j.
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Second, consider whether lump sum taxes are optimal with and without volatility.
Corollary 2 When the government knows the state of the world before making its decisions, lump sum taxes are optimal, but when the government does not know the state of the world before making its decision, this no longer holds.
Corollary 2 captures the tradeoff between private and public volatility embedded in the optimal tax rule with volatility. Lump sum taxes minimize deadweight loss. Without volatility, minimizing deadweight loss is optimal; therefore, lump sum taxes are optimal. With volatility, lump sum taxes provide certain revenue to the government and concentrate risk in private consumption. In this case, welfare can often be improved by spreading risk between public and private consumption; therefore, lump sum taxes are not optimal with volatility.
This result is related to but distinct from the result that lump sum taxes are inefficient with uncertainty in private consumption. Eaton and Rosen (1980) notes that proportional taxation of earnings provides insurance to individuals because the government shares in both losses and gains. In the case with volatility, this insurance is also true but comes with a cost of increased volatility of public consumption. In the case with volatility, therefore, proportional taxation is not solely insurance in private consumption but also about sharing risk between public and private consumption. For example, in the case with exogenous income and uncertainty a 100% earnings tax with lump sum payments of the expected value of earnings would be optimal, as in the case considered by Eaton and Rosen (1980) , but is not optimal in the case of volatility because it concentrates risk in public consumption (the opposite case of lump sum taxes).
Finally, corrollary 3 derives a sufficient condition to determine whether a government's tax policy deviates from the optimal rule, without specifying a utility function.
Corollary 3 A tax system does not satisfy the optimal tax rule with volatility if for some good j the elasticities of good j and the volatility of good j are both larger than for any other good k = j. ε x j ,τ j > ε x k ,τ k and e σg,τ j > e σg,τ k .
Corollary 3 can be used to empirically test whether states deviate from the optimal tax rule in Theorem 1. This empirical test is demonstrated in section 5.4. To implement this test, I first note that the elasticity of good j with respect to tax rate j equals the elasticity of tax revenues of good j with respect to tax rate j minus one. The condition in corollary 3 reduces to comparing the elasticity of tax revenue and the elasticity of revenue volatility scaled by tax revenues.
Deriving an Optimal Tax Portfolio

Principles of Optimal Taxation from Optimal Portfolio Theory
An alternative approach to understanding the optimal tax rule with volatility is to consider optimal tax rates as akin to an optimal portfolio of assets a government holds. For example, consider the optimal tax rule in the absence of deadweight loss and private consumption volatility. This is the case when the representative agent can perfectly smooth shocks to private consumption, and taxes do not cause a substitution between consumption goods (e.g., perfect complements). In this case, the government's objective function reduces to minimizing the variance of public good consumption, τ W x τ, subject to the expected revenue constraint,ḡ = τ µ x . With this objective function, tax rates τ can be thought of as weights on different assets x, as in the classic portfolio selection model of Markowitz (1952) .
Corollary 4
The optimal tax rule reduces to the formula for optimal portfolio weights when the representative agent can perfectly smooth shocks to private consumption, and taxes do not cause a substitution of consumption goods (e.g., perfect complements).
Corollary 4 captures the tradeoff between taxing different sources to hedge revenuespecific risk. Several aspects of optimal taxation can be illuminated by appealing to the literature on optimal portfolio weights. First, uniform taxation is optimal if each revenue source is independently and identically distributed and non-negative (Samuelson, 1967) .
Uniform taxation, therefore, is not generally optimal if revenue sources are not independently and identically distributed and non-negative. Second, if revenue stream j is independently distributed from the other revenue streams, then the optimal tax system must have a positive tax on revenue stream j.
13 These characterizations highlight that hedging revenue-specific risk should be added to the set of optimal tax principles-especially for governments that find it difficult to smooth revenues.
Characterizing the Optimal Tax Portfolio
To understand the effects of tax rates on tax revenue volatility, consider the variance of tax revenue when a government taxes two goods. For concreteness call the two goods wage income I = wl, which is a function of a wage and labor supply l, and taxable consumption c = βC, which is a function of total consumption C and the fraction of consumption in the consumption tax base. Labor supply and the fraction of consumption in the consumption tax base are chosen by the representative agent and depend on the wage and consumption tax rates, τ w and τ c . For exposition, assume wages and total consumption are random variables with variances σ 2 w and σ 2 c and covariance σ w,c . In this example, the variance of public consumption is,
See Appendix B for a microfounded model with the same variance of public consumption.
The total derivative of the variance of tax revenue, allowing the tax rate on wage income to vary is
Equation (4) can be broken into three parts: (1) the direct effect, which captures the change in income tax revenue volatility and its covariance with consumption tax revenue, (2) the horizontal effect, which captures the change in the volatility of consumption tax revenues from a change in the wage income tax, and (3) the higher moments effect, which captures the effect of changing the wage income tax on the variance and covariance of wage income and consumption.
The direct effect is damped due to behavioral responses of the representative individual, defined as leakage. The leakage is given by the elasticity of labor supply, which increasingly damps the direct effect as the elasticity of labor supply becomes more negative. The sign on the horizontal effect depends on whether the change in the wage income tax causes individuals to consume more or less of the private goods in the consumption tax base, captured by the elasticity of β with respect to the wage income tax rate.
Traditional optimal portfolio problems only consider the direct effect, without leakage.
However, because the government is a large player, its optimal portfolio problem must consider the horizontal and higher moment effects. Said differently, actions of the government have broader implications for the economy as a whole than a single trader optimizing their personal portfolio.
Minimum Variance Frontier
Similar to traditional optimal portfolio problems, the government is constrained by a minimum volatility frontier. On this frontier, tax portfolios have the minimum volatility for a given expected level of tax revenue. Portfolios on the minimum volatility frontier are characterized by the condition ε σ 2 g ,τc
Corollary 5 The set of feasible tax portfolios a government can hold is constrained by a minimum volatility frontier that includes leakage, horizontal effects, and higher order effects, in addition to the direct effect considered in traditional optimal portfolio problems.
Figure 1 draws the minimum volatility frontier with volatility on the horizontal axis and expected revenue on the vertical axis. The underlying economic uncertainty is taken as exogenous in the minimum volatility frontier, e.g., the variance of wages and total consumption.
Differences in risk between tax portfolios are due to differences in tax policy. For example, a portfolio consisting solely of a highly progressive income tax is riskier than a balanced portfolio that includes and consumption taxes.
The frontier is increasing and concave. The shape of the frontier implies that the amount of volatility a government needs to accept increases as the level of expected revenues increases.
This has implications for how much of the public good the government should provide. It is well understood that the cost of taxation due to deadweight loss is convex. The addition of volatility, as highlighted by the minimum volatility frontier, adds to this convexity because the cost of volatility also increases as the mean increases.
The minimum variance frontier demonstrates that tax revenues may be volatile because governments are holding portfolios with high expected tax revenues or because governments are holding portfolios far off of the minimum variance frontier. Knowing why tax revenues are volatile is important for policymakers. To separate these two components, the following 13 section decomposes risk into necessary and unnecessary risk and derives a volatility index.
Excessive Risk Index
This section derives an excessive risk index that characterizes the necessary and unnecessary risk of a tax portfolio. The riskiness of a tax portfolio can be characterized in many different ways-each with their own implications. The purpose of the excessive risk index is to provide a measure of mean-volatility efficiency, which is distinct from volatility and other such measures.
Corollary 6 Risk from tax policy can be decomposed into economic uncertainty and necessary and unnecessary tax policy risk.
To develop intuition for different measures of riskiness consider the four tax portfolios and the minimum volatility frontier drawn in Figure 1 . Volatility of each tax portfolio is given on the horizontal axis, such that portfolios C and D are more volatile than portfolio
A.
14 The change in volatility (holding economic conditions fixed) represents the tax effect; the amount of additional volatility due to changes in a state's tax rates. For example, a state changing its tax rate to move from portfolio A to D would be accepting more volatility.
The tax effect, however, does not distinguish between efficient and inefficient risk. Whether a state is efficiently accepting more risk or not depends on whether it is moving closer or further away from its minimum volatility frontier. In the example drawn in Figure 1 , moving from portfolio A to D moves the government closer to its frontier. This government, therefore, increases its volatility (as seen on the horizontal axis) but does so in a relatively efficient manner.
The goal of the excessive risk index is to provide a measure that captures the effi-14 The riskiness of a portfolio can also be measured relative to its mean by the coefficient of variation (or inverse Sharpe ratio), defined as the volatility divided by the mean. With this measure of riskiness, portfolio C is less risky than portfolio A, even though it has a higher volatility because portfolio C's mean is sufficiently larger than portfolio A's mean. In contrast, the coefficient of variation still characterizes portfolio D as being riskier than portfolio A because portfolio D's mean is not sufficiently larger than portfolio A's. cient/inefficient acceptance of risk.
The excessive risk index for a portfolio with expected tax revenue µ A and volatility σ A is defined as
where µ M V is the expected tax revenue on the minimum volatility frontier for the level of
The excessive risk index is bounded by 0 and 100.
A portfolio with an excessive risk index of zero indicates the tax portfolio does not accept any unnecessary risk because the portfolio is on the minimum volatility frontier, that
The excessive risk index can be interpreted as the cost of unnecessary risk measured as the percentage of tax revenues lost by not being on the frontier.
To better understand the excessive risk index, consider two tax policy changes, one from portfolio C to portfolio B and one from portfolio C to portfolio A. Both led to the same decrease in volatility, as measured on the horizontal axis. However, the change from C to B had a substantially smaller decrease in revenues than the change from C to A. The excessive risk index for portfolio C is zero, because it is on the minimum volatility frontier. Similarly, the excessive risk index for portfolio B is zero. The move from portfolio C to B is, therefore, a move between two efficient portfolios. In contrast, the move from C to A led to a larger loss in expected tax revenues. This loss is captured by the difference in expected tax revenues between portfolio B and portfolio A. 
Measuring Volatility
The empirical analysis defines the volatility of a variable y i,t as the log of the absolute value of the residual, ε i,t (y i,t ), from its nonparametrically estimated time trend,
where i denotes state and t denotes year. This measure of volatility represents year-over-year variability and abstracts from differences in time trends across states.
17
15 The results are robust to using only state level collections.
16 Appendix C provides additional descriptive statistics on how the tax bases states rely on have changed and the correlation across tax bases.
Tax Revenue Accounting Identity and Econometric Model 4.3.1 Deriving Tax Revenues and Tax Revenue Volatility
Tax revenues from a given source is the product of a tax rate times a tax base:
where R j is the revenue from source j, τ is a vector of tax rates, x is a vector of economic conditions, and B j (τ, x) is defined as the tax base for revenue source j. For example, sales tax revenues equal the sales tax rate times the sales tax base, which is the part of personal consumption that is taxable. Changes in the sales tax base represent changes in government policy (e.g., a change in which goods are taxed) and changes in individual behavior (e.g., consuming more online). These changes affect the mapping from tax rates and economic conditions to the size of the tax base and therefore are captured by changes in the tax base function B j (·).
Tax revenues are uncertain due to uncertainty about the tax base (tax rates are set by the government ex ante). The variance of tax revenues, therefore, can be written as,
The log of tax revenue and the variance of tax revenues can be written as,
The tax base can be approximated by a function of economic conditions and tax rates such that the log of the tax base and the variance of the tax base can be written as
Combining this approximation with the accounting identity creates an econometric model for tax revenues and tax revenue volatility that can be used in estimation, simulations, and decompositions.
log(σ
Estimating Elasticities for the Optimal Tax Rule
To demonstrate the optimal tax rule, I compare the income and sales tax-two major sources of revenues for most states. I use data from 1970-2014 to estimate the elasticity of income and sales tax revenue and the elasticity of income and sales tax revenue volatility. 18 I estimate these four elasticities using equations (14) and (15).
I estimate these four regressions separately for each state and exclude states that do not collect both income and sales taxes. The average elasticity over all years is given by the coefficient on the log of the specific tax rate, β. Year-specific elasticities are given by has a small weight. These probabilities are estimated using a logit model with a dependent variable equal to one for state i and zero otherwise. The shares of GDP in each industry are used as independent variables to capture the similarity in economic conditions.
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Using weighted least squares, I estimate equations (14) and (15) Each regression in equations (14) and (15) The share of GDP in each industry provides a measure of the economic activity that determines the response of tax revenues and tax revenue volatility to different tax rates and economic shocks. The results are robust to using additional independent variables in the logit model including tax rates, personal income, population, and land area.
20 The coincident indexes are created using a dynamic single-factor model. For more information, see Crone and Clayton-Matthews (2005) and https://www.philadelphiafed.org/research-and-data/regionaleconomy/indexes/coincident/. squared tax rates consistently have t-statistics above three.
The identifying assumption is that the conditional expectation of the error term is zero.
Some concern over misspecification of the model is alleviated by noting that the regressions in equations (14) and (15) are derived from an accounting identity. The identifying assumption could still be violated due to omitted variable bias or the inclusion of endogenous variables.
The results are qualitatively similar when using state and year fixed effects, regional dummy variables, and regional dummy variables interacted with time dummy variables that control for time-varying regional omitted variables. Endogenous variables may be a concern if state governments can predict, and respond to, tax revenue projections by changing their tax rates. This does not appear to be a major concern as the model is robust to using two-year lags of the tax rates.
Minimum Volatility Frontier Estimation
To estimate each state's minimum volatility frontier, expected tax revenue and tax revenue volatility are simulated for nearly 200,000 different tax portfolios using estimates from equations (14) and (15). Each tax portfolio is characterized by the sales, corporate, and top and bottom income tax rates. Each tax rate takes on 21 different values between zero and the larger of either four or 115 percent of the largest tax rate the specific state has levied.
21 Each value of a given tax rate is then paired with every other value of each of the other three tax rates, creating nearly 200,000 different tax portfolios.
The simulation estimates the mean and volatility of the tax revenues using the actual economic conditions of the state to decompose changes into tax policy and economic conditions. 22 The minimum volatility frontier is estimated as the upper convex hull of the nearly 200,000 simulated points in volatility and expected revenue space. Figure A. 1 graphs the 21 The tax rate values are used to limit out-of-sample projection in the simulation. The results are robust to using different upper bounds.
22 Using the actual economic conditions of the state abstracts from any general equilibrium effects the tax rates might have on the economic conditions. 20 simulated portfolios for Illinois and the convex hull used to estimate a minimum volatility frontier. This process is run separately for each state, producing state-specific minimum volatility frontiers. A similar process is used to estimate the expected tax revenue and tax revenue volatility for each of the actual tax portfolios a state levied in 1970 and 2014. Table 1 reports the percent change in volatility, tax risk, and the excessive risk index. Volatility increased by 11.8% on average and increased in most states. This increase in volatility has caused welfare costs for states because it is difficult for states to smooth revenues. Tax risk, which measures the impact of tax policy changes on risk, increased by 7.3% on average and in 45 states. This increase in tax risk suggests a substantial portion of the increase in volatility is due to policy changes; consistent with evidence from Seegert (2012). This increase, however, does not distinguish between efficient increases in risk (in return for higher expected revenues) and inefficient increases in risk. The excessive risk index, however, does distinguish between efficient and inefficient changes in tax risk.
Empirical Results
Changes in Volatility, Tax Risk, and Excessive Risk Index
There are two key aggregate findings in Table 1 Despite the decrease in excessive risk index, Idaho increased its tax risk by 9%. Idaho's experience underscores the difference between volatility (which includes economic factors), risk associated with tax rate changes (tax effect), and the excessive risk index. The following section uses corollary 3 to test whether states are overdependent on their income or sales tax revenues.
New York, Virginia, Utah, and Illinois
Optimal Tax Rule
Corollary 3 provides a benchmark to test whether states are deviating from the optimal tax rule. To demonstrate how to test for deviations, I consider two representative years: 1970 and 2014. Comparing the number of states that violate the optimal tax rule provides evidence on whether tax policy became more or less efficient at trading off deadweight loss and volatility over this period. It is important to note that there are other potential reasons a state may deviate from the optimal tax rule as given in Theorem 1. For example, the optimal tax rule does not take into account redistributive motives. This analysis only provides evidence on the relative tradeoff between deadweight loss and volatility. Also, the condition in corollary 3 is a sufficient condition, which means that states that do not violate the condition may still violate the optimal tax rule. 
Conclusion
This paper provides a framework for understanding tax revenue volatility. Using a standard model of optimal taxation and allowing for uncertainty demonstrates how states should optimally tradeoff the costs of tax revenue volatility and deadweight loss. From this tradeoff, several corollaries follow. First, lump sum taxes are shown to no longer be optimal with volatility. Second, sufficient conditions are derived for testing the tradeoff between volatility and deadweight loss. Third, the optimal tax rule is shown to be the traditional Ramsey rule without volatility and the optimal portfolio weights without deadweight loss. Fourth, governments are constrained by a minimum variance frontier that demonstrates governments must accept more risk to increase expected revenues. Finally, an excessive risk index is derived to distinguish between efficient and inefficient risk.
To demonstrate the theoretical framework, data from 1970 to 2014 and the 50 US states are used. States are found to be increasing their tax risk but in relatively efficient ways. Even so, states could increase their expected tax revenues by roughly 40 percent without increasing their tax revenue volatility. This suggests a large cost to states associated with their current (imbalanced) tax portfolios. From 1970 to 2014, ten additional states deviated from the optimal tax rule, bringing the total to 36. The majority of these states are overdependent on the income tax, relative to the sales tax.
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Future research is needed to understand the trade-offs involved with tax revenue volatility and other optimal taxation considerations. For example, states may be able to decrease their tax revenue volatility by decreasing the progressivity of their income tax, but this comes at a cost of decreasing the benefits associated with redistribution. In addition, the model in this paper provides a framework for future research to investigate different hedging opportunities for state governments. Considering optimal taxation with uncertainty will become increasingly important as economic conditions become more uncertain. 
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Least Efficient Most Efficient 1964-1998 1999-2007 1964-1998 1999-2007 1964-1998 1999-2007 Sales vs income Corporate vs Sales and Income NOTE-Graphing state government's tax portfolios onto a two-simplex demonstrates how much a government relies on each tax bases. A two-simplex is a triangle drawn in two-space that represents three-space. In this case, the dimensions are tax revenues collected from income, sales, and corporate tax bases as a percentage of the sum of these three tax bases. The simplex is characterized by ∆ 2 = {(s income , s sales , scorporate ∈ R 3 |s income + s sales + scorporate = 1)}, where s income is the percentage of revenue collected from the income tax. Panel C is an example of a two-simplex that depicts the percentage of tax revenue from income, sales, and corporate tax bases (three-space) in two-space. The nodes of the simplex denoted by A, B, and C represent tax portfolios that rely on only one tax base. Each node of the triangle represents a portfolio made up entirely of one tax base with nodes at (0, 0), (1, 0), and (0.5, 0.866) corresponding to a portfolio entirely of sales, income, or corporate tax revenue respectively. Point A represents a tax portfolio that relies only on the sales tax, point B a tax portfolio that relies only on the income tax, and C only the corporate tax. Interior points represent mixtures of the three tax bases. Point D represents a tax portfolio that relies equally on all three. Point E represents a tax portfolio that relies fifty percent on corporate tax revenue and fifty percent on income tax revenue. Movements along the dashed lines xx, yy, and zz represent changes in the reliance on two of the three tax bases. For example, moving along the dashed line zz shifts the reliance on sales and income taxes but keeps the reliance on the corporate tax fixed. Similarly, moving along the line yy shifts the reliance on the sales and income taxes but for a a tax portfolio that relies less on the corporate tax than portfolios along the line zz. Finally, moving along the line xx represents tax portfolios shifting between the income and corporate tax, holding fixed the reliance on the sales tax.
Order of Decisions
Choices 1st -Government t c , t w 2nd -Nature w, π 3rd -Individual l, c 1 , c 2 4th -Production occurs 5th -Utility realized
A. Individual Behavior
A representative individual provides l units of labor to the market for which she gets paid a wage w. Total net income, y = (1 − t w )wl + π, consists of wage income, net of the wage tax, and profit income. The individual knows her wage and profit income at the time of her decisions. She uses this net income for private consumption, c, that is split between goods that are taxed, c 1 ≡ βc, and goods that are untaxed, c 2 ≡ (1 − β)c. For notation purposes, it is beneficial to write the individual's choices as (l, c, β) where β is the fraction of total consumption that is in the sales tax base.
The representative individual maximizes her utility, which consists of her supply of labor, l, total private consumption, c, the fraction of consumption in the sales tax base, β, and a public good, g, max c,l,β u = U (c, l, β; g) subject to y = (1 − β)c + βc(1 + t c ).
Utility maximization requires that (i) the marginal disutility from supplying labor equals the marginal utility of the income it produces, given in equation (Appendix B.1), and (ii) the ratio of marginal utilities of total consumption, c, and the split of consumption, β, is equal to the consumption tax rate multiplied by consumption, given in equation (Appendix B.2). When the consumption tax rate is zero, there is no distortion between consumption goods, and the marginal utility with respect to β is zero. Composing utility in terms of total consumption, c, and the fraction of consumption that is taxed, β, simplifies the composition of deadweight loss because β encompasses all behavioral responses between goods.
−U 2 = (1 − t w )wU 1 (Appendix B.1)
B. Nature Nature chooses the wage and profit income I = (w, π) from the distribution h(Ī, σ 2 I ), where these realizations are allowed to be correlated.
25 Private consumption depends on the realization of the wage and profit income. The mean and variance of private consumption 25 The variance of the wage and profit are denoted by σ 3) Consumption and wage income are not perfectly correlated as long as income from wages and profits are not perfectly correlated. The ability of the government to hedge idiosyncratic risk between consumption and wage income tax bases depends on the correlation between these two variables.
C. Government
The government sets the tax rates on wage income and consumption (t w and t c ) to maximize the expected utility of the representative individual. Tax revenues finance the production of a public good, g = t w wl + t c βc, that enters the representative individual's utility. The expected utility can be written as a function of the moments (e.g., mean, variance, skewness) of the state-dependent variables. This analysis restricts attention to the cases where expected utility is fully characterized by a function of the first two moments (mean and variance) but is robust to considering higher order moments. This restriction holds if the joint distribution of the state-dependent variables is fully characterized by the first two moments (e.g., normal, log-normal, or uniform).
27 The utility function is assumed to be additively separable in private and public consumption, U 1,4 = 0, such that the government's objective function can be written as where expected utility is increasing in private and public consumption, V 1 > 0 and V 2 > 0, and decreasing in volatility and labor supply, V 3 < 0, V 4 < 0, and V 5 < 0. The relative magnitudes of the marginal disutility from volatility capture the ability of the government and representative-agent to smooth consumption. For example, V 3 = 0 models a representativeagent that can perfectly smooth private consumption. The variance of private consumption is given in equation (Appendix B.3), and the variance of public consumption (or tax revenue) is given by Two insights about tax revenue volatility follow from this equation. First, tax revenue volatility depends on the interaction between tax rates and the underlying economic uncertainty. For example, the variance of tax revenues is zero if the government sets its tax rates to zero or if there is no underlying economic uncertainty (σ 2 c = 0 and σ 2 w = 0). Second, taxing only the base with least uncertainty does not necessarily minimize the variance of tax revenues because the variance of tax revenues depends on the square of the tax rate and the covariance of the tax bases, σ w,c . This provides an incentive for the government to tax both income and consumption as a hedge against idiosyncratic risk in either tax base. consumption goods into total consumption and the fraction spent on taxable items. This section demonstrates the change of variables and its benefits.
First, start with two goods, B, N, such that the consumption of B is taxed and the consumption of N is not taxed and the representative agent has utility U(B, N ) over the two goods. By definition, B = βc and N = (1 − β)c. The utility function can be written as a function of β and c by substituting these equations in for B and N . If the utility function is homothetic, then the utility function can be written as U(B, N ) = v(β)U (c), otherwise U(B, N ) = U (c, β). The budget constraint is given below written both as a function of B and N and β and c. Now we want to know the welfare impact of a tax change. We can separate the impact into the wealth effect and the substitution effect where the substitution effect is the deadweight loss from the behavioral responses. 
Income Effect
The benefit of writing the utility in terms of β and c is that U 1 ∂c ∂τc captures the income effect and U 2 ∂β ∂τc captures the behavioral response and deadweight loss. 
Appendix C Empirical
